How can I prevent XSS attacks in a JSP/Servlet web application?
XSS can be prevented in JSP by using JSTL <c:out> tag or fn:escapeXml() EL function when (re)displaying user-controlled input. This includes request parameters, headers, cookies, URL, body, etc. Anything which you extract from the request object. Also the user-controlled input from previous requests which is stored in a database needs to be escaped during redisplaying.
For example:
<p><c:out value="${bean.userControlledValue}"></p>
<p><input name="foo" value="${fn:escapeXml(param.foo)}"></p>
This will escape characters which may malform the rendered HTML such as <, >, ", ' and & into HTML/XML entities such as <, >, ", ' and &.
Note that you don't need to escape them in the Java (Servlet) code, since they are harmless over there. Some may opt to escape them during request processing (as you do in Servlet or Filter) instead of response processing (as you do in JSP), but this way you may risk that the data unnecessarily get double-escaped (e.g. & becomes & instead of & and ultimately the enduser would see & being presented), or that the DB-stored data becomes unportable (e.g. when exporting data to JSON, CSV, XLS, PDF, etc which doesn't require HTML-escaping at all). You'll also lose social control because you don't know anymore what the user has actually filled in. You'd as being a site admin really like to know which users/IPs are trying to perform XSS, so that you can easily track them and take actions accordingly. Escaping during request processing should only and only be used as latest resort when you really need to fix a train wreck of a badly developed legacy web application in the shortest time as possible. Still, you should ultimately rewrite your JSP files to become XSS-safe.
If you'd like to redisplay user-controlled input as HTML wherein you would like to allow only a specific subset of HTML tags like <b>, <i>, <u>, etc, then you need to sanitize the input by a whitelist. You can use a HTML parser like Jsoup for this. But, much better is to introduce a human friendly markup language such as Markdown (also used here on Stack Overflow). Then you can use a Markdown parser like CommonMark for this. It has also builtin HTML sanitizing capabilities. See also Markdown or HTML.
The only concern in the server side with regard to databases is SQL injection prevention. You need to make sure that you never string-concatenate user-controlled input straight in the SQL or JPQL query and that you're using parameterized queries all the way. In JDBC terms, this means that you should use PreparedStatement instead of Statement. In JPA terms, use Query.
An alternative would be to migrate from JSP/Servlet to Java EE's MVC framework JSF. It has builtin XSS (and CSRF!) prevention over all place. See also CSRF, XSS and SQL Injection attack prevention in JSF.
The how-to-prevent-xss has been asked several times. You will find a lot of information in StackOverflow. Also, OWASP website has an XSS prevention cheat sheet that you should go through.
On the libraries to use, OWASP's ESAPI library has a java flavour. You should try that out. Besides that, every framework that you use has some protection against XSS. Again, OWASP website has information on most popular frameworks, so I would recommend going through their site.
I had great luck with OWASP Anti-Samy and an AspectJ advisor on all my Spring Controllers that blocks XSS from getting in.
public class UserInputSanitizer {
private static Policy policy;
private static AntiSamy antiSamy;
private static AntiSamy getAntiSamy() throws PolicyException {
if (antiSamy == null) {
policy = getPolicy("evocatus-default");
antiSamy = new AntiSamy();
}
return antiSamy;
}
public static String sanitize(String input) {
CleanResults cr;
try {
cr = getAntiSamy().scan(input, policy);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
return cr.getCleanHTML();
}
private static Policy getPolicy(String name) throws PolicyException {
Policy policy =
Policy.getInstance(Policy.class.getResourceAsStream("/META-INF/antisamy/" + name + ".xml"));
return policy;
}
}
You can get the AspectJ advisor from the this stackoverflow post
I think this is a better approach then c:out particular if you do a lot of javascript.
Managing XSS requires multiple validations, data from the client side.
Input Validations (form validation) on the Server side. There are multiple ways of going about it. You can try JSR 303 bean validation(hibernate validator), or ESAPI Input Validation framework. Though I've not tried it myself (yet), there is an annotation that checks for safe html (#SafeHtml). You could in fact use Hibernate validator with Spring MVC for bean validations -> Ref
Escaping URL requests - For all your HTTP requests, use some sort of XSS filter. I've used the following for our web app and it takes care of cleaning up the HTTP URL request - http://www.servletsuite.com/servlets/xssflt.htm
Escaping data/html returned to the client (look above at #BalusC explanation).
I would suggest regularly testing for vulnerabilities using an automated tool, and fixing whatever it finds. It's a lot easier to suggest a library to help with a specific vulnerability then for all XSS attacks in general.
Skipfish is an open source tool from Google that I've been investigating: it finds quite a lot of stuff, and seems worth using.
There is no easy, out of the box solution against XSS. The OWASP ESAPI API has some support for the escaping that is very usefull, and they have tag libraries.
My approach was to basically to extend the stuts 2 tags in following ways.
Modify s:property tag so it can take extra attributes stating what sort of escaping is required (escapeHtmlAttribute="true" etc.). This involves creating a new Property and PropertyTag classes. The Property class uses OWASP ESAPI api for the escaping.
Change freemarker templates to use the new version of s:property and set the escaping.
If you didn't want to modify the classes in step 1, another approach would be to import the ESAPI tags into the freemarker templates and escape as needed. Then if you need to use a s:property tag in your JSP, wrap it with and ESAPI tag.
I have written a more detailed explanation here.
http://www.nutshellsoftware.org/software/securing-struts-2-using-esapi-part-1-securing-outputs/
I agree escaping inputs is not ideal.
My personal opinion is that you should avoid using JSP/ASP/PHP/etc pages. Instead output to an API similar to SAX (only designed for calling rather than handling). That way there is a single layer that has to create well formed output.
If you want to automatically escape all JSP variables without having to explicitly wrap each variable, you can use an EL resolver as detailed here with full source and an example (JSP 2.0 or newer), and discussed in more detail here:
For example, by using the above mentioned EL resolver, your JSP code will remain like so, but each variable will be automatically escaped by the resolver
...
<c:forEach items="${orders}" var="item">
<p>${item.name}</p>
<p>${item.price}</p>
<p>${item.description}</p>
</c:forEach>
...
If you want to force escaping by default in Spring, you could consider this as well, but it doesn't escape EL expressions, just tag output, I think:
http://forum.springsource.org/showthread.php?61418-Spring-cross-site-scripting&p=205646#post205646
Note: Another approach to EL escaping that uses XSL transformations to preprocess JSP files can be found here:
http://therning.org/niklas/2007/09/preprocessing-jsp-files-to-automatically-escape-el-expressions/
If you want to make sure that your $ operator does not suffer from XSS hack you can implement ServletContextListener and do some checks there.
The complete solution at: http://pukkaone.github.io/2011/01/03/jsp-cross-site-scripting-elresolver.html
#WebListener
public class EscapeXmlELResolverListener implements ServletContextListener {
private static final Logger LOG = LoggerFactory.getLogger(EscapeXmlELResolverListener.class);
#Override
public void contextInitialized(ServletContextEvent event) {
LOG.info("EscapeXmlELResolverListener initialized ...");
JspFactory.getDefaultFactory()
.getJspApplicationContext(event.getServletContext())
.addELResolver(new EscapeXmlELResolver());
}
#Override
public void contextDestroyed(ServletContextEvent event) {
LOG.info("EscapeXmlELResolverListener destroyed");
}
/**
* {#link ELResolver} which escapes XML in String values.
*/
public class EscapeXmlELResolver extends ELResolver {
private ThreadLocal<Boolean> excludeMe = new ThreadLocal<Boolean>() {
#Override
protected Boolean initialValue() {
return Boolean.FALSE;
}
};
#Override
public Object getValue(ELContext context, Object base, Object property) {
try {
if (excludeMe.get()) {
return null;
}
// This resolver is in the original resolver chain. To prevent
// infinite recursion, set a flag to prevent this resolver from
// invoking the original resolver chain again when its turn in the
// chain comes around.
excludeMe.set(Boolean.TRUE);
Object value = context.getELResolver().getValue(
context, base, property);
if (value instanceof String) {
value = StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml4((String) value);
}
return value;
} finally {
excludeMe.remove();
}
}
#Override
public Class<?> getCommonPropertyType(ELContext context, Object base) {
return null;
}
#Override
public Iterator<FeatureDescriptor> getFeatureDescriptors(ELContext context, Object base){
return null;
}
#Override
public Class<?> getType(ELContext context, Object base, Object property) {
return null;
}
#Override
public boolean isReadOnly(ELContext context, Object base, Object property) {
return true;
}
#Override
public void setValue(ELContext context, Object base, Object property, Object value){
throw new UnsupportedOperationException();
}
}
}
Again: This only guards the $. Please also see other answers.
<%# page import="org.apache.commons.lang.StringEscapeUtils" %>
String str=request.getParameter("urlParam");
String safeOuput = StringEscapeUtils.escapeXml(str);
Related
How can I prevent XSS attacks in a JSP/Servlet web application?
XSS can be prevented in JSP by using JSTL <c:out> tag or fn:escapeXml() EL function when (re)displaying user-controlled input. This includes request parameters, headers, cookies, URL, body, etc. Anything which you extract from the request object. Also the user-controlled input from previous requests which is stored in a database needs to be escaped during redisplaying.
For example:
<p><c:out value="${bean.userControlledValue}"></p>
<p><input name="foo" value="${fn:escapeXml(param.foo)}"></p>
This will escape characters which may malform the rendered HTML such as <, >, ", ' and & into HTML/XML entities such as <, >, ", ' and &.
Note that you don't need to escape them in the Java (Servlet) code, since they are harmless over there. Some may opt to escape them during request processing (as you do in Servlet or Filter) instead of response processing (as you do in JSP), but this way you may risk that the data unnecessarily get double-escaped (e.g. & becomes & instead of & and ultimately the enduser would see & being presented), or that the DB-stored data becomes unportable (e.g. when exporting data to JSON, CSV, XLS, PDF, etc which doesn't require HTML-escaping at all). You'll also lose social control because you don't know anymore what the user has actually filled in. You'd as being a site admin really like to know which users/IPs are trying to perform XSS, so that you can easily track them and take actions accordingly. Escaping during request processing should only and only be used as latest resort when you really need to fix a train wreck of a badly developed legacy web application in the shortest time as possible. Still, you should ultimately rewrite your JSP files to become XSS-safe.
If you'd like to redisplay user-controlled input as HTML wherein you would like to allow only a specific subset of HTML tags like <b>, <i>, <u>, etc, then you need to sanitize the input by a whitelist. You can use a HTML parser like Jsoup for this. But, much better is to introduce a human friendly markup language such as Markdown (also used here on Stack Overflow). Then you can use a Markdown parser like CommonMark for this. It has also builtin HTML sanitizing capabilities. See also Markdown or HTML.
The only concern in the server side with regard to databases is SQL injection prevention. You need to make sure that you never string-concatenate user-controlled input straight in the SQL or JPQL query and that you're using parameterized queries all the way. In JDBC terms, this means that you should use PreparedStatement instead of Statement. In JPA terms, use Query.
An alternative would be to migrate from JSP/Servlet to Java EE's MVC framework JSF. It has builtin XSS (and CSRF!) prevention over all place. See also CSRF, XSS and SQL Injection attack prevention in JSF.
The how-to-prevent-xss has been asked several times. You will find a lot of information in StackOverflow. Also, OWASP website has an XSS prevention cheat sheet that you should go through.
On the libraries to use, OWASP's ESAPI library has a java flavour. You should try that out. Besides that, every framework that you use has some protection against XSS. Again, OWASP website has information on most popular frameworks, so I would recommend going through their site.
I had great luck with OWASP Anti-Samy and an AspectJ advisor on all my Spring Controllers that blocks XSS from getting in.
public class UserInputSanitizer {
private static Policy policy;
private static AntiSamy antiSamy;
private static AntiSamy getAntiSamy() throws PolicyException {
if (antiSamy == null) {
policy = getPolicy("evocatus-default");
antiSamy = new AntiSamy();
}
return antiSamy;
}
public static String sanitize(String input) {
CleanResults cr;
try {
cr = getAntiSamy().scan(input, policy);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
return cr.getCleanHTML();
}
private static Policy getPolicy(String name) throws PolicyException {
Policy policy =
Policy.getInstance(Policy.class.getResourceAsStream("/META-INF/antisamy/" + name + ".xml"));
return policy;
}
}
You can get the AspectJ advisor from the this stackoverflow post
I think this is a better approach then c:out particular if you do a lot of javascript.
Managing XSS requires multiple validations, data from the client side.
Input Validations (form validation) on the Server side. There are multiple ways of going about it. You can try JSR 303 bean validation(hibernate validator), or ESAPI Input Validation framework. Though I've not tried it myself (yet), there is an annotation that checks for safe html (#SafeHtml). You could in fact use Hibernate validator with Spring MVC for bean validations -> Ref
Escaping URL requests - For all your HTTP requests, use some sort of XSS filter. I've used the following for our web app and it takes care of cleaning up the HTTP URL request - http://www.servletsuite.com/servlets/xssflt.htm
Escaping data/html returned to the client (look above at #BalusC explanation).
I would suggest regularly testing for vulnerabilities using an automated tool, and fixing whatever it finds. It's a lot easier to suggest a library to help with a specific vulnerability then for all XSS attacks in general.
Skipfish is an open source tool from Google that I've been investigating: it finds quite a lot of stuff, and seems worth using.
There is no easy, out of the box solution against XSS. The OWASP ESAPI API has some support for the escaping that is very usefull, and they have tag libraries.
My approach was to basically to extend the stuts 2 tags in following ways.
Modify s:property tag so it can take extra attributes stating what sort of escaping is required (escapeHtmlAttribute="true" etc.). This involves creating a new Property and PropertyTag classes. The Property class uses OWASP ESAPI api for the escaping.
Change freemarker templates to use the new version of s:property and set the escaping.
If you didn't want to modify the classes in step 1, another approach would be to import the ESAPI tags into the freemarker templates and escape as needed. Then if you need to use a s:property tag in your JSP, wrap it with and ESAPI tag.
I have written a more detailed explanation here.
http://www.nutshellsoftware.org/software/securing-struts-2-using-esapi-part-1-securing-outputs/
I agree escaping inputs is not ideal.
My personal opinion is that you should avoid using JSP/ASP/PHP/etc pages. Instead output to an API similar to SAX (only designed for calling rather than handling). That way there is a single layer that has to create well formed output.
If you want to automatically escape all JSP variables without having to explicitly wrap each variable, you can use an EL resolver as detailed here with full source and an example (JSP 2.0 or newer), and discussed in more detail here:
For example, by using the above mentioned EL resolver, your JSP code will remain like so, but each variable will be automatically escaped by the resolver
...
<c:forEach items="${orders}" var="item">
<p>${item.name}</p>
<p>${item.price}</p>
<p>${item.description}</p>
</c:forEach>
...
If you want to force escaping by default in Spring, you could consider this as well, but it doesn't escape EL expressions, just tag output, I think:
http://forum.springsource.org/showthread.php?61418-Spring-cross-site-scripting&p=205646#post205646
Note: Another approach to EL escaping that uses XSL transformations to preprocess JSP files can be found here:
http://therning.org/niklas/2007/09/preprocessing-jsp-files-to-automatically-escape-el-expressions/
If you want to make sure that your $ operator does not suffer from XSS hack you can implement ServletContextListener and do some checks there.
The complete solution at: http://pukkaone.github.io/2011/01/03/jsp-cross-site-scripting-elresolver.html
#WebListener
public class EscapeXmlELResolverListener implements ServletContextListener {
private static final Logger LOG = LoggerFactory.getLogger(EscapeXmlELResolverListener.class);
#Override
public void contextInitialized(ServletContextEvent event) {
LOG.info("EscapeXmlELResolverListener initialized ...");
JspFactory.getDefaultFactory()
.getJspApplicationContext(event.getServletContext())
.addELResolver(new EscapeXmlELResolver());
}
#Override
public void contextDestroyed(ServletContextEvent event) {
LOG.info("EscapeXmlELResolverListener destroyed");
}
/**
* {#link ELResolver} which escapes XML in String values.
*/
public class EscapeXmlELResolver extends ELResolver {
private ThreadLocal<Boolean> excludeMe = new ThreadLocal<Boolean>() {
#Override
protected Boolean initialValue() {
return Boolean.FALSE;
}
};
#Override
public Object getValue(ELContext context, Object base, Object property) {
try {
if (excludeMe.get()) {
return null;
}
// This resolver is in the original resolver chain. To prevent
// infinite recursion, set a flag to prevent this resolver from
// invoking the original resolver chain again when its turn in the
// chain comes around.
excludeMe.set(Boolean.TRUE);
Object value = context.getELResolver().getValue(
context, base, property);
if (value instanceof String) {
value = StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml4((String) value);
}
return value;
} finally {
excludeMe.remove();
}
}
#Override
public Class<?> getCommonPropertyType(ELContext context, Object base) {
return null;
}
#Override
public Iterator<FeatureDescriptor> getFeatureDescriptors(ELContext context, Object base){
return null;
}
#Override
public Class<?> getType(ELContext context, Object base, Object property) {
return null;
}
#Override
public boolean isReadOnly(ELContext context, Object base, Object property) {
return true;
}
#Override
public void setValue(ELContext context, Object base, Object property, Object value){
throw new UnsupportedOperationException();
}
}
}
Again: This only guards the $. Please also see other answers.
<%# page import="org.apache.commons.lang.StringEscapeUtils" %>
String str=request.getParameter("urlParam");
String safeOuput = StringEscapeUtils.escapeXml(str);
How can I prevent XSS attacks in a JSP/Servlet web application?
XSS can be prevented in JSP by using JSTL <c:out> tag or fn:escapeXml() EL function when (re)displaying user-controlled input. This includes request parameters, headers, cookies, URL, body, etc. Anything which you extract from the request object. Also the user-controlled input from previous requests which is stored in a database needs to be escaped during redisplaying.
For example:
<p><c:out value="${bean.userControlledValue}"></p>
<p><input name="foo" value="${fn:escapeXml(param.foo)}"></p>
This will escape characters which may malform the rendered HTML such as <, >, ", ' and & into HTML/XML entities such as <, >, ", ' and &.
Note that you don't need to escape them in the Java (Servlet) code, since they are harmless over there. Some may opt to escape them during request processing (as you do in Servlet or Filter) instead of response processing (as you do in JSP), but this way you may risk that the data unnecessarily get double-escaped (e.g. & becomes & instead of & and ultimately the enduser would see & being presented), or that the DB-stored data becomes unportable (e.g. when exporting data to JSON, CSV, XLS, PDF, etc which doesn't require HTML-escaping at all). You'll also lose social control because you don't know anymore what the user has actually filled in. You'd as being a site admin really like to know which users/IPs are trying to perform XSS, so that you can easily track them and take actions accordingly. Escaping during request processing should only and only be used as latest resort when you really need to fix a train wreck of a badly developed legacy web application in the shortest time as possible. Still, you should ultimately rewrite your JSP files to become XSS-safe.
If you'd like to redisplay user-controlled input as HTML wherein you would like to allow only a specific subset of HTML tags like <b>, <i>, <u>, etc, then you need to sanitize the input by a whitelist. You can use a HTML parser like Jsoup for this. But, much better is to introduce a human friendly markup language such as Markdown (also used here on Stack Overflow). Then you can use a Markdown parser like CommonMark for this. It has also builtin HTML sanitizing capabilities. See also Markdown or HTML.
The only concern in the server side with regard to databases is SQL injection prevention. You need to make sure that you never string-concatenate user-controlled input straight in the SQL or JPQL query and that you're using parameterized queries all the way. In JDBC terms, this means that you should use PreparedStatement instead of Statement. In JPA terms, use Query.
An alternative would be to migrate from JSP/Servlet to Java EE's MVC framework JSF. It has builtin XSS (and CSRF!) prevention over all place. See also CSRF, XSS and SQL Injection attack prevention in JSF.
The how-to-prevent-xss has been asked several times. You will find a lot of information in StackOverflow. Also, OWASP website has an XSS prevention cheat sheet that you should go through.
On the libraries to use, OWASP's ESAPI library has a java flavour. You should try that out. Besides that, every framework that you use has some protection against XSS. Again, OWASP website has information on most popular frameworks, so I would recommend going through their site.
I had great luck with OWASP Anti-Samy and an AspectJ advisor on all my Spring Controllers that blocks XSS from getting in.
public class UserInputSanitizer {
private static Policy policy;
private static AntiSamy antiSamy;
private static AntiSamy getAntiSamy() throws PolicyException {
if (antiSamy == null) {
policy = getPolicy("evocatus-default");
antiSamy = new AntiSamy();
}
return antiSamy;
}
public static String sanitize(String input) {
CleanResults cr;
try {
cr = getAntiSamy().scan(input, policy);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
return cr.getCleanHTML();
}
private static Policy getPolicy(String name) throws PolicyException {
Policy policy =
Policy.getInstance(Policy.class.getResourceAsStream("/META-INF/antisamy/" + name + ".xml"));
return policy;
}
}
You can get the AspectJ advisor from the this stackoverflow post
I think this is a better approach then c:out particular if you do a lot of javascript.
Managing XSS requires multiple validations, data from the client side.
Input Validations (form validation) on the Server side. There are multiple ways of going about it. You can try JSR 303 bean validation(hibernate validator), or ESAPI Input Validation framework. Though I've not tried it myself (yet), there is an annotation that checks for safe html (#SafeHtml). You could in fact use Hibernate validator with Spring MVC for bean validations -> Ref
Escaping URL requests - For all your HTTP requests, use some sort of XSS filter. I've used the following for our web app and it takes care of cleaning up the HTTP URL request - http://www.servletsuite.com/servlets/xssflt.htm
Escaping data/html returned to the client (look above at #BalusC explanation).
I would suggest regularly testing for vulnerabilities using an automated tool, and fixing whatever it finds. It's a lot easier to suggest a library to help with a specific vulnerability then for all XSS attacks in general.
Skipfish is an open source tool from Google that I've been investigating: it finds quite a lot of stuff, and seems worth using.
There is no easy, out of the box solution against XSS. The OWASP ESAPI API has some support for the escaping that is very usefull, and they have tag libraries.
My approach was to basically to extend the stuts 2 tags in following ways.
Modify s:property tag so it can take extra attributes stating what sort of escaping is required (escapeHtmlAttribute="true" etc.). This involves creating a new Property and PropertyTag classes. The Property class uses OWASP ESAPI api for the escaping.
Change freemarker templates to use the new version of s:property and set the escaping.
If you didn't want to modify the classes in step 1, another approach would be to import the ESAPI tags into the freemarker templates and escape as needed. Then if you need to use a s:property tag in your JSP, wrap it with and ESAPI tag.
I have written a more detailed explanation here.
http://www.nutshellsoftware.org/software/securing-struts-2-using-esapi-part-1-securing-outputs/
I agree escaping inputs is not ideal.
My personal opinion is that you should avoid using JSP/ASP/PHP/etc pages. Instead output to an API similar to SAX (only designed for calling rather than handling). That way there is a single layer that has to create well formed output.
If you want to automatically escape all JSP variables without having to explicitly wrap each variable, you can use an EL resolver as detailed here with full source and an example (JSP 2.0 or newer), and discussed in more detail here:
For example, by using the above mentioned EL resolver, your JSP code will remain like so, but each variable will be automatically escaped by the resolver
...
<c:forEach items="${orders}" var="item">
<p>${item.name}</p>
<p>${item.price}</p>
<p>${item.description}</p>
</c:forEach>
...
If you want to force escaping by default in Spring, you could consider this as well, but it doesn't escape EL expressions, just tag output, I think:
http://forum.springsource.org/showthread.php?61418-Spring-cross-site-scripting&p=205646#post205646
Note: Another approach to EL escaping that uses XSL transformations to preprocess JSP files can be found here:
http://therning.org/niklas/2007/09/preprocessing-jsp-files-to-automatically-escape-el-expressions/
If you want to make sure that your $ operator does not suffer from XSS hack you can implement ServletContextListener and do some checks there.
The complete solution at: http://pukkaone.github.io/2011/01/03/jsp-cross-site-scripting-elresolver.html
#WebListener
public class EscapeXmlELResolverListener implements ServletContextListener {
private static final Logger LOG = LoggerFactory.getLogger(EscapeXmlELResolverListener.class);
#Override
public void contextInitialized(ServletContextEvent event) {
LOG.info("EscapeXmlELResolverListener initialized ...");
JspFactory.getDefaultFactory()
.getJspApplicationContext(event.getServletContext())
.addELResolver(new EscapeXmlELResolver());
}
#Override
public void contextDestroyed(ServletContextEvent event) {
LOG.info("EscapeXmlELResolverListener destroyed");
}
/**
* {#link ELResolver} which escapes XML in String values.
*/
public class EscapeXmlELResolver extends ELResolver {
private ThreadLocal<Boolean> excludeMe = new ThreadLocal<Boolean>() {
#Override
protected Boolean initialValue() {
return Boolean.FALSE;
}
};
#Override
public Object getValue(ELContext context, Object base, Object property) {
try {
if (excludeMe.get()) {
return null;
}
// This resolver is in the original resolver chain. To prevent
// infinite recursion, set a flag to prevent this resolver from
// invoking the original resolver chain again when its turn in the
// chain comes around.
excludeMe.set(Boolean.TRUE);
Object value = context.getELResolver().getValue(
context, base, property);
if (value instanceof String) {
value = StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml4((String) value);
}
return value;
} finally {
excludeMe.remove();
}
}
#Override
public Class<?> getCommonPropertyType(ELContext context, Object base) {
return null;
}
#Override
public Iterator<FeatureDescriptor> getFeatureDescriptors(ELContext context, Object base){
return null;
}
#Override
public Class<?> getType(ELContext context, Object base, Object property) {
return null;
}
#Override
public boolean isReadOnly(ELContext context, Object base, Object property) {
return true;
}
#Override
public void setValue(ELContext context, Object base, Object property, Object value){
throw new UnsupportedOperationException();
}
}
}
Again: This only guards the $. Please also see other answers.
<%# page import="org.apache.commons.lang.StringEscapeUtils" %>
String str=request.getParameter("urlParam");
String safeOuput = StringEscapeUtils.escapeXml(str);
Freemarker is used as the default template engine in the ninja web framework. The framework assigns some default values to a template which are globaly available when using the ninja web framework. I have created an extension for the template which does enbales CSRF-Protection. The extension offers a function which can be used in a template, e.g.
${foo(bar)}
At the moment the function needs to be called with specific parameters, which is not very intuitiv. Using a macro I could simplify this call to
#{foo}
and the user doesn't need to worry about passing the correct (e.g. "bar") parameter. But to make this available in the ninja web framework I have to define a macro programmatically. Is that possible?
UPDATE
Sorry for the confusion. Meant <#foo/> instead of #{foo} ...
Looking at the Freemarker documentation I maybe can make more clear what I want to achieve: http://freemarker.org/docs/ref_directive_macro.html
Like I explained above I am passing a custom function to the template, enabling me to call
${foo("bar")}
What I want to do, is call this via a macro like
#<myMacro/>
But the defined macro like
<#macro myMacro>
${foo("bar")}
</#macro>
should not be defined in the template but programmatically. Hope that makes it more clear.
UPDATE2 / SOLUTION
I ended up using the recommended TemplateDirectiveModel.
public class TemplateEngineFreemarkerAuthenticityTokenDirective implements TemplateDirectiveModel {
private String authenticityToken;
public TemplateEngineFreemarkerAuthenticityTokenDirective(Context context) {
this.authenticityToken = context.getSession().getAuthenticityToken();
}
#Override
public void execute(Environment env, Map params, TemplateModel[] loopVars, TemplateDirectiveBody body) throws TemplateException, IOException {
if (!params.isEmpty()) {
throw new TemplateException("This directive doesn't allow parameters.", env);
}
if (loopVars.length != 0) {
throw new TemplateException("This directive doesn't allow loop variables.", env);
}
Writer out = env.getOut();
out.append(this.authenticityToken);
}
}
FreeMarker macro invocations doesn't look like #{...}. Is that some kind of Ninja-specific extension?
Anyway, if you know that there's a bar in the data-model, then your method can get it like Environment.getCurrentEnvironment().getDataModel().get("bar"), so it need not be passed in.
Also, it's maybe useful to know that FTL has two kind of "subroutines", the function-like ones, and the directive-like ones. Both can be implement both in FTL (#function, #macro) and in Java (plain Java methods, TemplateMethodModelEx, TemplateDirectiveModel). The real difference is that the function-like ones are for calculating values, and the directive-like ones are for printing values directly to the output (hence bypassing auto-escaping) and for side-effects. But all of these can reach the Environment, so there's no difference there.
You can call a macro "dynamically". Let's say you had a macro:
<#macro myMacro>
${foo("bar")}
</#macro>
You can call it like this:
<#myMacro />
OR
<#.vars["myMacro"] />
So then you can do...
<#assign someVar = "myMacro" />
<#.vars[someVar] />
I should probably point out that Spring is not in and of itself necessarily crucial to this question, but I encountered this behavior while using Spring, so the question uses the situation in Spring in which I encountered this.
I have a controller class that maps requests for GET and POST requests to the same set of URLs for a particular form. This form has different URLs for different locales, but there is only one method for the GET request, and one for the POST, since the logic at the controller level for the form is identical for each locale site (but things deeper in the logic, like locale-specific validation, may be different). Example:
#Controller
public class MyFormController {
// GET request
#RequestMapping(value={"/us-form.html", "/de-form.html", "/fr-form.html"},
method={RequestMethod.GET})
public String showMyForm() {
// Do some stuff like adding values to the model
return "my-form-view";
}
// POST request
#RequestMapping(value={"/us-form.html", "/de-form.html", "/fr-form.html"},
method={RequestMethod.POST})
public String submitMyForm() {
// Do stuff like validation and error marking in the model
return "my-form-view"; // Same as GET
}
}
The form GET and POST works just fine when written like this. You'll notice that the String arrays used for the #RequestMapping values are identical. What I want to do is put those URLs into one spot (ideally a static final field in the controller) so that when we add new URLs (which correspond to the form in future localized sites), we can just add them in one spot. So I tried this modification to the controller:
#Controller
public class MyFormController {
// Moved URLs up here, with references in #RequestMappings
private static final String[] MY_URLS =
{"/us-form.html", "/de-form.html", "/fr-form.html"};
// GET request
#RequestMapping(value=MY_URLS, // <-- considered non-constant
method={RequestMethod.GET})
public String showMyForm() {
// Do some stuff like adding values to the model
return "my-form-view";
}
// POST request
#RequestMapping(value=MY_URLS, // <-- considered non-constant
method={RequestMethod.POST})
public String submitMyForm() {
// Do stuff like validation and error marking in the model
return "my-form-view"; // Same as GET
}
}
The problem here is that the compiler complains about the value attribute no longer being a constant. I am aware that Spring requires that value must be a constant, but I had thought that using a final field (or static final in my case) with an Array literal containing String literals would have passed as "constant". My suspicion here is that the array literal has to be constructed on the fly in such a way that it is uninitialized when the value attribute is parsed.
I feel like this shouldn't be a hard thing to figure out with a basic Java knowledge, but something is escaping me that I haven't been able to find any answers for after some research. Can someone confirm my suspicion and give a citation or good explanation for why that may be so, or deny my suspicion and explain what the actual issue is?
Note: I cannot simply combine the URLs into a Path Pattern, as each form URL is in its localized site's language, and matching on that would be impossible. I merely give the "/{locale}-form.html" strings above as my URLs for example's sake.
You're right, this is nothing to do with Spring, all Annotation parameters must be compile-time constants. That's a basic java language rule.
Marking the array reference as final doesn't cut it because this is still perfectly legal:
MY_URLS[0] = "es-form.html";
Also, how locked in are you into embedding locale into the url like that in the first place? Are you emulating legacy links? Spring has plenty of built in support for using the browser's actual locale.
I am using the MyFaces 1.1 ValidateRegExpr tag to validate the input from a user against a regular expression.
I would like to be able to dynamically assign the regex pattern via code, but according to http://myfaces.apache.org/commons11/myfaces-validators11/tagdoc/mcv_validateRegExpr.html the attribute pattern does not support Expression Language.
The markup in my JSP file is supposed to look like this:
<tc:in value="${dataBean.currentBean.field}">
<mcv:validateRegExpr
pattern="${dataBean.currentBean.validationRegEx}"
message="${dataBean.currentBean.validationMessage" />
</tc:in>
What is the preferred way of dynamically assigning attribute values to jsp controls that do not support EL?
Implement a javax.faces.validator.Validator and register it as <validator> in faces-config.xml. In a real Java class you have the freedom to write normal Java code :)
Basic kickoff example:
public void validate(FacesContext context, UIComponent component, Object value) throws ValidatorException {
SomeBean someBean = SomeFacesUtil.evaluateExpressionGet("someBean", SomeBean.class);
if (!value.toString().matches(someBean.getPattern())) {
throw new ValidatorException(new FacesMessage(someBean.getMessage()));
}
}